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Abstract 
Wireless sensor networks are widely used in industrial process control, human health care, environmental 
control, vehicular tracking and battlefield surveillance, etc. A wireless sensor network consists of lots of sensor nodes 
and a gateway node. The sensor node usually communicates with the gateway node and users over an ad hoc wireless 
network. However, due to the open environments, the wireless sensor networks are vulnerable to variety of security 
threats. Thus, it is a critical issue to adopt a suitable authentication mechanism for wireless sensor networks to 
enhance security. In 2009, Vaidya et al. proposed a robust user authentication schemes for wireless sensor networks. 
In this article, we will show that their scheme is vulnerable to the guessing attack and the impersonation attack. Since 
it needs a secure channel for communications in password changing phase, their scheme is also inconvenient and 
expensive for users to update passwords. We also propose an improved scheme to remedy the flaws. The improved 
scheme withstands the replay attack and off-line guessing attack, and the users can freely update their passwords via 
public channels.  
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1.  Introduction 
Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) [1-4, 6] are used in many industrial and consumer applications such as industrial 
process, human health care, environmental control, vehicular tracking, habitat monitoring and battlefield surveillance, etc. A 
WSN system consists of lots of sensor nodes and a gateway node [7]. The sensor nodes, with low processing power and limited 
storage space, usually communicate over an ad hoc wireless network [10]. The sensor nodes transmit data through network to 
the gateway cooperatively or independently. Generally, the communications of the WSNs are bidirectional so that the sensor 
nodes send data to the gateway and the gateway is capable to control the sensor's activity.  
Due to the open environments, the security problem is one of the most important issues for the wireless sensor networks. 
Especially in some applications, e.g., battlefield surveillance, the collected data is critical. It is required to adopt security 
mechanisms to protect the collected secrets. It is essential to provide authentication between the gateway node (GWN) and 
sensor nodes (SDs), between the GWN and users and between the sensor nodes and users while transmitting data [3]. User 
authentication protocol provides a method for every entity to validate each other; it is an important mechanism for network 
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security. Authentication mechanism can prevent adversaries attack WSNs by retrieving, modifying or replacing the information 
collected by sensor nodes. Until now, a lot of methods proposed to enhance the security of the application systems. But due to 
the highly constrained nature on computation capability and memory space of sensor nodes, it is difficult to implement complex 
security algorithms in WSNs [8].   
In 1981, Lamport [5] proposed the first user authentication scheme for communication in insecure channel. Hereafter, 
many user authentication schemes have been proposed to prevent unauthorized users gaining access to the system. Wong et al. 
[12] proposed a dynamic user authentication scheme for wireless sensor networks. But their scheme has security weaknesses 
such as it cannot withstand the replay and forgery attacks, passwords could be revealed by any of the sensor nodes, and 
password cannot be updated freely. Das [4] proposed a two-factor user authentication scheme in WSNs to overcome the 
security flaws. Tseng [9] also propose a modified scheme to remedy the weakness. However, Tseng et al.’s scheme is vulnerable 
to guessing attack and impersonation attack  
In 2009, Vaidya et al. [10] proposed an improved robust user authentication schemes for WSNs, which is a variation of 
strong-password based solution proposed by Wong et al. [12] and modified version of the scheme [11]. Though Vaidya et al.'s 
scheme provides mutual authentication and capable to protect against the replay attack, the forgery attack and the 
man-in-the-middle attack. However, in this article, we will show that their scheme is vulnerable to the guessing attack and the 
impersonation attack. Moreover, since it needs a secure channel for communications in password changing phase, Vaidya et 
al.'s scheme is inconvenient and expensive for users to update their passwords. We propose an improved scheme to remedy the 
flaws. The improved scheme can withstand the replay attack and the off-line guessing attack, and the users can freely update 
their passwords through insecure open channels.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: All notations used throughout this article are listed in Section 2. In Section 
3, we briefly describe Vaidya et al.'s scheme. Next, the weaknesses of Vaidya et al.'s scheme are shown in Section 4. The 
improved scheme and its security analysis are presented in Section 5 and 6, respectively. Finally, we make conclusions in 
Section 7. 
2.  Preliminaries and notations 
Normally, a wireless sensor network is composed of four phases: registration phase, login phase, authentication phase, 
and password changing phase. All notations used throughout this article are listed as follows. 
(1) U : A legitimate user. 
(2) ID : A user’s identity. 
(3) GWN : A gateway node. 
(4) :SD  A sensor node. 
(5) PW : A user’s password. 
(6) x : The secret information of the gateway node. 
(7) )(h : A one-way hash function. 
(8) ⊕ : The exclusive-OR (XOR) operation. 
International Journal of Engineering and Technology Innovation, vol. 2, no. 4, 2012, pp. 283-292 
 
Copyright ©  TAETI 
285 
(9) }{:⇒ MBA : The entity A sends message M to the receiver B via a secure channel. 
(10)  }{:→ MBA : The entity A sends message M to the receiver B through a public channel. 
3. Vaidya et al.'s robust user authentication scheme  
Vaidya et al.'s scheme is described briefly as follows. 
3.1. Registration phase 
When a user wants to join the system, he/she sends identity ID  and hashed password vpw to the gateway node. The steps 
of the registration phase are as follows.  
Step R-1: },{:⇒ vpwIDGWNU   
The user U first chooses a password PW and computes )(= PWhvpw . Then, the user submits },{ vpwID  to the GWN via 
a secure channel.  
Step R-2: },,{:⇒ STXIDSDGWN  
After receiving },{ vpwID , the GWN computes ),(= xIDhX  with the secret key x, and stores },,,{ STXvpwID  in the 
database, where ST  is the current timestamp. Then, the GWN distributes },,{ STXID  to all sensor nodes. Next, the GWN 
responses to the user with successful registration information )}(_{ XegRSucc .  
Step R-3: The user stores X 
Upon receiving )}(_{ XegRSucc , the user stores X for future use.   
3.2. Login phase 
If a user wants to retrieve or transmit data from/to the sensor nodes, firstly, he/she should login the system. The login steps 
are as follows. 
Step L-1: },,{:→ tAIDSDU   
The user first computes ),(= tvpwhA , where t is the current timestamp. Then he/she sends },,{ tAID  to a sensor node SD 
through a public channel.  
Step L-2: },,,{:→ 0 tTCIDGWNSD   
After receiving the login request },,{ tAID , the sensor node checks whether ID is in its lookup table and checks whether 
t is in a valid time interval. The login request will be rejected if it is not. Otherwise, the sensor node computes 
)⊕⊕(= 0TAXhC  and sends },,,{ 0 tTCID  to the GWN. Where 0T  is the current time stamp.  
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3.3. Authentication phase 
The steps of the authentication phase are as follows.   
Step A-1: },,_{:→ 1TVLoginAccSDGWN  
On receiving },,,{ 0 tTCID  from the sensor node, the GWN checks whether },,{ 0 tTID  are valid. The login request will be 
stopped if it is not. If },,{ 0 tTID  are valid, the GWN computes ),(=' tvpwhA  and )⊕'⊕(=' 0TAXhC . Then a reject message is 
sent to the sensor node if CC≠' . Otherwise, the GWN computes },,{ STXID  and sends the accept message 
},,_{ 1TVLoginAcc ) to the sensor node, where 1T  is the current timestamp. 
Step A-2: },,,_{:→ 21 TTYLoginAccUSD  
After receiving },,_{ 1TVLoginAcc , the sensor node checks whether 1T  is in a valid time interval. If 1T  is valid, the SD 
checks whether VV ='  after computing ),,(=' 1TAXhV . If VV =' , SD computes ),(= 2TVhY  and sends 
},,,_{ 21 TTYLoginAcc  to the user, where 2T  is the current timestamp. 
Step A-3: The user authenticates the sensor node.  
Upon receiving the message },,,_{ 21 TTYLoginAcc , the user checks the freshness of timestamps 1T  and 2T . If 1T  and 
2T  are both in the allowed time interval, the user computes ),,(=' 1TAXhV  and ),'(=' 2TVhY . The user will start obtaining or 
transmitting data if YY ='  holds.  
3.4. Password-changing phase  
The Vaidya et al.'s scheme provides users to freely update their passwords. The steps of the password changing phase are 
as follows. Note that the password changing phase should be performed via secure channels.  
Step C-1: },,{:⇒ newvpwvpwIDGWNU   
If the user wants to update the password, firstly, he/she chooses a new password newPW  and computes 
)(= newnew PWhvpw . Then, the user sends the triple },,{ newvpwvpwID  to the GWN via a secure channel.  
Step C-2: },{:⇒ 1TSIDSDGWN  
Upon receiving },,{ newvpwvpwID , the GWN checks ID and vpw. If both of them are true, the GWN updates its database 
and sends password changing successful information }_{ ChangeSucc  to the user. At the same time, the GWN distributes the 
updated information to all the sensor nodes.  
Step C-3: All sensor nodes update their databases.    
Upon receiving updated information, all server nodes update their databases after ID is verified.   
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4. Weakness of the Vaidya et al.'s scheme 
Though Vaidya et al.'s scheme, besides providing mutual authentication, has several advantages such as protection 
against the replay attack, the forgery attack and the man-in-the-middle attack. However, in this section, we will show that their 
scheme is vulnerable to the guessing attack and the impersonation attack. Moreover, since it needs a secure channel for 
communications, Vaidya et al.'s scheme is inconvenient and expensive on updating password.     
(1) It is vulnerable to the password guessing attack.    
In Step L-1 of the login phase, the user sends },,{ tAID  to a sensor node through public channel, where ),(= tvpwhA  and 
)(= PWhvpw . An adversary can be easily guesses the password by the following steps:  
Step G-1: Adversary intercepts },,{ tAID  in Step L-1.  
Step G-2: By using the guessed password PW' and the intercepted timestamp t, the adversary computes A' with 
)),'((=' tPWhhA .  
Step G-3: The step G-2 is repeated if AA≠' . The correct password will be obtained if AA =' .  
In general, for the sake of easily memorization, the bit-length of the password is not quite long. Thus, the correct password 
can be easily obtained with a very high probability of PWP 21= , where PW  is the bit-length of password. For illustration, 
the password guessing attack is shown in Fig. 1.   
 
Fig. 1 The password guessing attack on Vaidya et al.'s scheme 
(2) It is vulnerable to the impersonation attack.    
Vaidya et al.'s scheme is also vulnerable to the impersonation attack. We describe the impersonation attack by the 
following three cases:  
Case 1. An adversary impersonates as the legitimate user. 
As described in (1) of this section, Vaidya et al.'s scheme cannot withstand guessing attack. If the password is correctly 
guessed, the adversary can impersonate as a legitimate user to retrieve information from any sensor node. The attack is 
successful due to the gateway and sensor nodes authenticate the users only by passwords.  
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Case 2. An adversary impersonates as the sensor node to fool the user. 
The GWN sends },,_{ 1TVLoginAcc  to the SD in Step A-1for authentication, an adversary can compute 'Y  by using the 
intercepted information V and the new timestamp '2T  with )',(=' 2TVhY . Then, the adversary sends }',,',_{ 21 TTYLoginAcc  
to the user. Upon receiving }',,',_{ 21 TTYLoginAcc , the user will authenticate the adversary if '2T  is in the allowed time 
interval. Thus, an adversary can impersonate as the sensor node to release fake sensor data. For illustration, the impersonation 
attack is shown in Fig. 2.  
Case 3. A malicious sensor node impersonates as the gateway node. 
Suppose that a malicious sensor node wants to impersonate as the gateway node to attack the system. Due to the malicious 
SD (MSD for short) knows X and can obtain A from Step L-1, he/she can compute V with ),,(= 1TAXhV  for legitimate SD to 
authenticate GWN in Step A-1. That is the MSD can compute and forward fake message for other sensor nodes to pass the 
verification, and the legitimate SDs suppose that they communicate with the real GWN.  
  
 
 
 
Fig. 2 The impersonation attack (An adversary impersonates as a sensor node) 
 
 
International Journal of Engineering and Technology Innovation, vol. 2, no. 4, 2012, pp. 283-292 
 
Copyright ©  TAETI 
289 
(3) It needs secure channel in password-changing phase. 
Since the user sends },,{ newvpwvpwID  to the gateway node for password updating, where )(= PWhvpw  and 
)(= newnew PWhvpw , an adversary will obtain the old password PW and the new password newPW  easily if the message is 
transmitted through public channels. Thus, in Vaidya et al.'s scheme, a secure channel should be required in password changing 
phase. However, the secure channel is more expensive than the public channel. In order to prevent secret message from leakage, 
the user should forwards the message in person or use a cryptographic mechanism to ensure the security. This makes it is 
inconvenient and expensive on updating password.   
5. The improved user authentication scheme for wireless sensor networks 
In this section, we will describe the improved scheme. The improved scheme is also composed of four phases. The 
registration phase of the improved scheme is the same as Vaidya et al.'s scheme. The login phase, authentication phase, and 
password changing phase are described as follows. 
5.1. Login phase 
If a user wants to obtain or transmit data from sensor nodes, the login steps are as follows. 
Step IL-1: },,{:→ 1UTAIDSDU   
The user U computes ),,(= 1UTXvpwhA  and sends },,{ 1UTAID  to a sensor node SD through a public channel, where 
1UT  is the current timestamp.  
Step IL-2: },,,{:→ 11 SU TTBIDGWNSD   
Upon receiving the login request },,{ 1UTAID , the sensor node checks whether ID and 1UT  are valid. The login request 
will be rejected if it is not. Otherwise, the sensor node retrieves the corresponding A and computes )⊕⊕(= 1STAXhB  and 
sends },,,{ 11 SU TTBID  to the GWN, where is 1ST the current timestamp.   
5.2. Authentication phase 
The steps of the authentication phase are as follows.  
Step IA-1: },{:→ GTCSDGWN  
On receiving },,,{ 11 SU TTBID  from the SD, the GWN checks whether },,{ 11 SU TTID  are valid. The login request will be 
rejected if it is not. If },,{ 11 SU TTID  are valid, the GWN computes ),,(' 1UTXvpwhA   and )⊕'⊕(=' 1STAXhB . Then GWN 
checks whether BB ='  holds. The GWN computes ),',(= GTBXhC  and sends message },{ GTC  to the sensor node if BB =' , 
where GT  is the current timestamp. 
Step IA-2: },{:→ 2STDUSD  
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After receiving },{ GTC , the sensor node checks whether GT  is in a valid interval. If GT  is valid, SD computes 
),,(=' GTBXhC . The GWN is authenticated if CC =' . Next, SD computes ),)⊕((= 2STAXhhD  and sends },{ 2STD  to the 
user.  
Step IA-3: The user authenticates the sensor node.  
After receiving },{ 2STD , the user checks the freshness of timestamps 2ST . If 2ST  is in a valid time interval, the user 
computes ),)⊕((' 2STAXhhD  . The user will start to obtain or transmit data if DD ='  holds.  
5.3. Password changing phase  
 
Fig. 3 The improved user authentication scheme for wireless sensor networks  
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The steps of the password changing phase are as follows. The communications of the password changing phase can be via 
insecure open channels.  
Step IC-1: :→GWNU  },,,{ 2UTFEID  
The user first chooses a new password newPW  and computes )(= newnew PWhvpw . Next, the user computes 
newvpwXhvpwhE ⊕))(,(=  and )),(,(= 2Unew TXhvpwhF , where 2UT  is the current timestamp. Finally, the user sends 
},,,{ 2UTFEID  to the GWN.  
Step IC-2: :→UGWN }_{ PasswordAcc  
Upon receiving },,,{ 2UTFEID , the GWN checks ID and 2UT . If both of them are valid, the GWN obtains newvpw  by 
))(,(⊕= XhvpwhEvpwnew . Then GWN computes )),(,(=' 2Unew TXhvpwhF  and checks whether F' is equal to the received 
message F. The GWN sends a successful password changing information }_{ PasswordAcc  to the user if FF ='  holds.  
Finally, the user replaces PW with newPW . The improved scheme is shown in Fig. 3 above. 
6.  Discussions and security analysis of the improved scheme 
In the improved scheme, only hash function and bitwise exclusive-OR operations are adopted in computation, thus the 
computation overhead is quite low. The scheme also has the merits as follows. 
(1) The proposed scheme withstands the replay attack. 
Due to the transmission information is maliciously or fraudulently repeated, many authentication schemes suffer the 
replay attack. In the improved scheme, all the transmission information contains timestamp, the receiver can detect the resent 
information by checking the freshness of the timestamp. Thus the improved scheme can withstand the replay attack. 
(2) The proposed scheme resists the off-line guessing attack. 
If an adversary wants to guess the password, though he/she intercepts },,{ 1UTAID  from Step IL-1, it is infeasible to 
correctly guess the password since ),,(= 1UTXvpwhA  and X is unknown by the adversary. Similarly, if an adversary wants to 
obtain the password from the transmission information in Step IL2, the trials also will fail due to )⊕⊕(= 1STAXhB . 
Moreover, since ),)⊕(( 2STAXhhD  , an adversary also cannot guess the password by using the information D. Thus the 
improved scheme resists the off-line guessing attack.   
(3) The proposed scheme provides mutual authentication.  
In the Step IL-2, the GWN will authenticate the user and SD by checking whether BB '  holds. The SD authenticates 
the user and the GWN by verifying C in Step IA-1. At last, in the Step IA-2, the user will authenticate the SD and GWN if DD ='  
is hold. Thus the improved scheme provides mutual authentication among the user, the sensor node and the gateway nodes. 
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7.  Conclusions 
Vaidya et al. proposed a robust user authentication schemes for wireless sensor networks. Though Vaidya et al.'s scheme 
provides mutual authentication and capable to protect against the replay attack, the forgery attack and the man-in- the-middle 
attack. However, since it needs a secure channel in password changing phase, Vaidya et al.'s scheme is inconvenient and 
expensive for users to update their passwords.  Moreover, their scheme is vulnerable to the guessing attack and the 
impersonation attack. We propose an improved scheme to remedy the flaws. The improved scheme can withstand the replay 
attack and off-line guessing attack, and the users can freely update their passwords via public channels.  
Acknowledgment  
This work was partially supported by the National Science Council of the Republic of China under the contract number 
NSC 101-2632-E-274-001-MY3.    
References   
[1]  I.F. Akyildiz, W. Su, Y. Sankarasubramaniam and E. Cayirci, “Wireless sensor networks: A survey,” Computer Networks, 
vol.38, pp.393-422, 2002. 
[2]  Z. Benenson, N. Gedicke and O. Raivio, “Realizing robust user authentication in sensor networks,” Workshop on 
Real-World Wireless Sensor Networks (REALWSN 2005), 2005. 
[3]  C.Y Chong, S. Kumar, “Sensor networks: evolution, opportunities, and challenges,” Proceedings of the IEEE, vol.91, 
pp.1247-1256, 2003.  
[4]  M.L. Das, “Two-factor user authentication in wireless sensor network,” IEEE Transaction on Wireless Communications, 
vol.8, pp.1086-1090, 2009. 
[5]  L. Lamport, “Password authentication with insecure communication,” Communications of the ACM, vol.24, pp.770-772, 
1981. 
[6]  I. E. Liao, C. C. Lee and M. S. Hwang, “Security enhancement for a dynamic ID-based remote user authentication scheme,” 
Proceedings of the IEEE International Conference on Next Generation Web Services Practices (NWeSP 2005), 2005, 
pp.22-26. 
[7]  K. Martinez, J.K. Hart, R. Ong, “Environmental sensor networks,” IEEE Computer, vol.37, pp.50-56, 2004. 
[8]  Z. Tan, “Cryptanalysis of a two-factor user authentication scheme in wireless sensor networks,” Advances in Information 
Sciences and Service Sciences, vol.3, pp.117-126, 2011. 
[9]  H.-R. Tseng, R.-H. Jan and W. Yang, “An improved dynamic user authentication scheme for wireless sensor networks,” 
Proceedings of the IEEE Global Telecommunications Conference, GLOBECOM '07, 2007, pp.986-990.   
[10] B. Vaidya, M. Chen and J.J.P.C. Rodrigues, "Improved robust user authentication scheme for wireless sensor networks," 
2009 Fifth IEEE Conference on Wireless Communication and Sensor Networks (WCSN), 2009, pp.1-6. 
[11] B Vaidya, J.S. Silva, J.J. Rodrigues, “Robust dynamic user authentication scheme for wireless sensor networks,”  
Proceedings of the 5th ACM Symposium on QoS and Security for wireless and mobile networks (Q2SWinet 2009), 
Tenerife, Spain, 2009, pp.88-91. 
[12]  K.H.M. Wong, Y. Zheng, J. Cao, and S. Wang, “A dynamic user authentication scheme for wireless sensor networks,” 
Proceedings of the IEEE International Conference on Sensor Networks, Ubiquitous, and Trustworthy Computing 
(SUTC’06), vol.1, 2006, pp.318-327. 
 
